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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX BAUCUS (CJO ANo ?o)
THE URUGUAY ROUND A
November 30, 1990
In the next few weeks, the world economy will reach a
crossroads.
This approaching rossroads, of course, is the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round next week in Brussels.
If we are able to reach a fully successful Uruguay Ptound
agreement trade barriers will be lowered, and the principles of
free trade will be extended to important new areas of the world
economy. Hiowever, if the Uruguay Round collapses or results in
tn inadeqflat&a 8eepnt, the stage will be set for increasing
trade conf1ict.
Unfortunately, it is easy to lose sight of this underlying
choice as we face a daily barrage of debates over the niinutiae
of agricultural subsidies, intellectual property protection,
and the operation of the Dumping Code. Certainly, those issues
are important. But they are the trees, not the whole forest.
I remain an optimist about the world seeing the forest
thru the trees and concluding the Uruguay Round, but the
hurdles that remain are truly daunting.
TRADING PARTNERS ATTITUDES
Probably the highfesthurdle is the intransigent attitude
of some major ddvi ped nationis anrd developing nations toward
the Round. Many of these countries seem to be taking positions
counter to their own national interest, and certainly counter
to the interest of the world.
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Clearly, the economic interests of all of these nations
would argue for them to take a different view, All have
benefited greatly from open international trade, and all would
have a great deal to lose if the GATT collapsed.
Further, do Japanese consumers really want to continue
paying seven times the world price for rice? Do consumers and
taxpayers in the EC really believe that they must continue to
spend $100 billion a year to subsidize agriculture? Does a
nation with a deficit problem as serious as Canada's really
benefit from extending large government subsidies? And do
Koreans really believe it is to their benefit to protect
inefficient farmers at the risk of seeing export markets close
to Korean products around the world?
As major trading nations, Japan, the EC, Canada, and Korea
all have a compelling economic interest in free trade. Those
nations-and the entire world would benefit from better rules to
protect intellectual property, rules to promote trade in
services and agriculture, and lower tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers. However, by ignoring these larger interests in favor
of narrow, sectoral concerns, these nations may well force the
collapse of the Round.
For example. the EC s insulting of fer: to trim agricultural
supports by only 30Z coupled with their recent decision to ban
meat imports from the U.S., demonstrate to the world that the
Community is more interested in posturing for its farmers than
concluding a GATT Agreement. The EC's steadfast refusal to
liberalize agricultural trade will soon force many agricultural
exporting nations -- perhaps including the U.S. -- to give up
hope of a successful Round.
Further, it is impossible to devise a regime to
meaningfully liberalize agricultural trade that allows Japan to
retain its ban on rice imports and Korea to retain its many
protectionist policies.
As we go into these final days or weeks of the Uruguay
Round, these extreme demands for continued protection cast a
dark shadow over the Uruguay Round.
THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
If $omevnion'shave focused-.too much on narrow interests
inthe Uruguay, >run4d, it cou'ld be said that the'Bsh
AdmiLisC1ttlh.. has focused too little on those concerns. By
pressing hard for free trade in services and agriculture,
liberal investment, and protection of intellectual property,
the Bush Administration has done the world a service by setting
a meaningful agenda for. the Uruguay Round. The Bush
Administration has also been successful in keeping entrenched
U.S. interests, such as the textile lobby, from having an undue
and counterproductive impact on the U.S. negotiating position,
But I would rather have seen the Bush Administration put
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more emphasis upon breaking down the specific trade barriers
that hinder U.S. exporters as well as being the standard bearer
of free trade.
Don't get me wrong. I fully support the Administration's
objectives in most areas and believe its efforts have done the
world a service. But I will be judging the success or failure
of the Round not on its success in defending the abstract
principle of free trade, but oneits success.in eliminating the
tangible trade barriers that block U.S. exports.
That is why .I am a strong suppottet of the "zero-for-zero"
tariff proposal that the U.S. has recently made. The concept
behind the zero-for-zero tariff proposal is simple and
powerfully attractive. The U.S. is offering to eliminate all
tariffs in particular industrial sectors if other nations do
likewise.
Tariffs are widely seen as yesterdays trade problem. But
this is just not the case, Tariffs are still a major
impediment to trade, Economic extimates indicate that the
zero-for-zero tariff proposal could generate billions in new
exports for the U.S. and many other nations. Consumers and
exporters in every nation in the world would benefit from a
sharp cut in tariffs.
Certainly, an impressive package of tariff cuts would
greatly smooth the path for legislation to implement the
Uruguay Round in the U.S. Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL PROSPECTS
If I sometimes criticize the Bush Administration's trade
negotiating strategy, I also have great sympathy for the unique
problems it faces at home.
Most major nations have parliamentary governments. This
means that these nations can generally be certain of delivering
on commitments made in trade negotiations.
This is not the case in the U.S. With the division of
power between the Congress and the Administration, the U.S.
Administration may face difficulty in implementing its
commitments. Often it seems that the Bush Administration faces
a two-front negotiation; First, it must negotiate with U.S.
trading partners to conclude an agreement. Then, it must
negotiate with the U.S. Congress to win approval of the
agreement.
This task is only brought within the realm of the possible
by a legislative process known as the "fast-track." The fast
track is essentially a commitment by the Congress to vote up-
or-down on legislation to implement a trade agreement without
offering amendments. The fast track also guarantees that the
Senate will not fillibuster implementing legislation. In
return, the Administration agrees to consult with Congress
during the negotiations and allow the key congressional
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Committees to write the legislation to implement the agreement.
The fast-track process is comparatively young. It has
been used only twice, to consider the Tokyo Round of GATT
Agreements and later the U.S, Canada Free Trade Agreement.
The fast track is a cumbersome arrangement. It is not
very popular e.tlher.in- Congress or within the Administration.
But it is the best- possible balanice between the Administration
and the Congress in this area. Clearly, the Congress will
never and should never surrender its Constitutional
responsibility for trade policy. But as a practical matter,
the Administration must carry out trade negotiations.
The fast track balances these concerns by allowing the
Administration to negotiate and guaranteeing a vote on the
agreement that is negotiated -- provided the Administration
cooperates with Congress during the negotiations. If the
Uruguay Round is successfully concluded, 'the implementing
legislation will provide a major test for the fast track.
Congresswill demand towrite the legislation. It will
also likely make changes in U.S. trade law that are not --
strictly speaking -- required by the agreement. It will
include these provisions to ensure that U.S. trade interests
are vigorously promoted within the limits of the agreement.
For example, this would be an appropriate time to revisit
Section 3sb and related issues.
But even if the legislation is carefully drafted and
includes these provisions, the .UruguaY Round is likely to face
serious congressional opposition. Certain entreched interests
in the U.S. do not see freer trade as being to their benefit,
and are almost certain to oppose legislation to implement the
Round. Those interests have powerful friends in Congress and a
majority vote in either the House or the Senate is all that
would be required to end the fast track and kill the Uruguay
Round.
As the last Congress drew to a close, 37 of my colleagues
introduced a resolution to deny fast track consideration for
the Uruguay Round implementing legislation. This resolution
grew partly out of concerns about the likely content of a
Uruguay Round package and partly out of resentment over the
fast track process.
Eliminatina the fas track woIld abort the.Uruguay Round.
The prospect of the Congress amending the agreement or simply
refusing to vote on it would almost certainly have been enough
to scuttle the Round. For this reason, working with a number
of my colleagues, -I was,. able. to block this resolution in the
last Congress, But opposition to the Uruguay Round in Congress
has already reached credible size and I suspect opponents of
the round willK force a vote on the fast tra'ckti tyetar.
If the fast track and the Uruguay Round are to survive
that vote, a Uruguay Round agreement must contain substantial,
concrete benefits for U.S. exporters. Unhlessi American
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exporters see the Round as clearly in their interest those
industries that oppose the RoundywijJ domiinate the,,debatea,,are,,
likely to carry the~day.- In light of: this, I do not support
the, notion of a Kmnimalistw agreement. There is negotiating
room, but I believe the Administration should even bother
attempting to conclude an agreement that fails to incorporate
all major U.S. negotiating objectives.
EXTENSION
Many have argued that the Uruguay Round need not be
concluded as scheduled. They argue that the Administration
could simply request a Congressional extension of the fast
track authority beyond the current deadline of March 1st.
That viewpoint ignores the political realities involved in
the negotiations. Though an extension is theoretically
possible. Ma6rh 1st should be treated as a firm deadline after
which the U.S. Congress will not extend fast track for the
Uruguay Round.
In light of the seeming intransigence of some of many
nations,. I see no reason for an extension if an agreement
cannot be concluded in the next several weeks. After all, will
the EC really find it easier to deal with the agriculture issue
next month or next year? I see no reason to think so.
Therefore, what merit could there be in extending unproductive
negotiations for another two years?
Further,, any attempt to extend might well be turned down
by Congress as demonstrated by the recent attempt to pass a
resolution to end the fast track. The debate over extension
might even provoke Congressional reconsidertaion of the fast
t~rack procedure. At minimum, I am convinced that Congress
4ould;onl'yvextend faigt track negotiating authotity subject to
addftidrai c6Aditi'ns sdch a's not negotiating about textiles.
Such conditions are likely to make it even more difficult to
negotiate a successful agreement.
It is important to keep in mind the skepticism with which
many in Congress view the GATT. For four years, the
Administration has held out the prospect of a successful
Uruguay Round as the a reason to defer controversial trade
legislation. The congressional reaction to a failed Round is
certain to be further disenchantment with the GATT and new
attempts to pass strong trade legislation.
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The U.S. would be far better off employing its resources
to promote the cause of free trade in other forums where it
might be mor .,successful rather than continuing to beat a dead
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should be devoted to negotiating bilateral agreements, such as
the U.S.-Canada FTA.
Bilateral agreements can effectively promote free trade --
albeit on a more limited scale than the GATT, Further, a few
successful bilateral agreements may Convince reluctant nations
that the GATT is in their best interest after all.
Negotiations to conclude a bilateral agreement with Mexico
are now getting underway. Agreements with other nations are
also possible. If the GATT does not yeild results, some
progress can certainly be made through bilateral negotiations.
The U.S. can also continue to use. Section 301 to attack
particular trade barriers. Though Section 301 is not popular
in some circles, it is an effective tool .for opening:.closed
markets. In fact, in recent years, Sdction 30I has had a far
bhtt r tecord than the GATT. The Administration has restrained
use of Section 301 in recent years in deference to the GATT
Round. If the: Round falls, the U.S. sill almost certainly
launch a new Round of Section 301 cases. Many nations may find
that blocking consideration of sensitive trade issues in the
GATT only leads to dealing with the same issues in the context
of Section 301 cases.
Further, the U.S,, unlike some other nations, is able to
protect its interests through unilateral steps, such as
agricultural export subsidies. The 1990 Farm Bill made cuts
in the U.S. agricultural budget anticipating a successful
Uruguay Round. But I am certain that Congress would take steps
to match European subsidies if the Round collapses. In fact,
the 1990 Farm Bill specifically contemplated increasing
supports if the Round ended without a meaningful agriculture
agreement.
Obviously, increasing U.S. subsidies could damage third
parties interests, but in the face of European subsidies the
U.S. has no alternative. The U.S. wJill not allow the EC to
subsidize American farmers out of business.
Taken together, these steps will minimize -- but not
eliminate -- the impact of a failed Uruguay Round on the U.S.
The U.S. will not make all the gains it hoped for, but the
losses will be controled. 'However, many other nations do not
have some or all of these options available. Those nations --
in many cases developing nations -- will surely suffer more
serious consequences. And when this happens they should lay
their problems squarely on the doorsteps of the EC, Japan, and
other nations ahose intransigence destroyed the Uruguay Round,
CONCLUSION
This Is the time that the tough trade policy decisions
must be made. The decisions made in Brussels over the next
week will determie which road the world economy will take.
If political courage can be mustered, a successful Round
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can be concluded. An agreement can be reached 
that extends
free trade principles to services and agriculture, 
protects
intellectual property, and sharply cuts tariff 
and non-tariff
barriers to trade. Such an agreement would put 
the world on a
path to greater prosperity and smoother international
relations.
,-But -if the political will is lacking the world 
will be put
on a-more dangerous course,. Protectionism is 
likely to
inuctease,'trade will contract, and the growth 
of the world
economy will' be shackled.
Some nations, like the U.S- and probably thie EC, 
will be
able to protect themselves. But all nations 
will bear some
pain and those smaller nations that depend on 
exports will pay
a heavy price.
I hope for political courage, both in Brussels 
and later
in the U.S. Congress. I certainly cannot guarantee 
that
Congress would approve any agreement negotiated 
in Brussels.
But if an agreement were to meet major U.S. objectives 
and
provide real benefits for U.S. exporters, I would 
work to win
approval of such an agreement. I believe the 
chances for
ultimate approval would be excellent.
oa-snDnfu dOIUNBS WOd 20LoO'edd 33:Z31 06, 67, nON
